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ABSTRACT
Access to life-saving treatments, and the role played by the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in reaching decisions,
continues to represent an important part of modern health policy. High
proﬁle cases and critical media coverage have sharpened public interest in
this issue.
In November 2008, the Conservative Party published detailed pro-
posals on NICE outlining policies for improving the systems and processes
for making decisions about NHS drug availability. The Conservatives
clearly state their support for NICE, but highlight six areas to improve
its conﬁguration, structure and efﬁciency. These areas are consistent
with the Conservative commitment to focus on health outcomes rather
than central targets.
A “NICE Charter” to codify the Institute’s roles and responsibilities;
scrapping the current system of Ministerial referral; allowing appraisals
to commence at the time of drug licensing; and increasing the use of
risk-sharing schemes are among the headline pledges.
The policy document also makes clear the need for pharmaceutical
companies to better demonstrate product clinical value by shifting the
burden of proof from NICE to the manufacturer. Improved cooperation
between industry and NICE is promised through the creation of a steering
committee. Furthermore, a clear commitment to evaluate wider social
costs and beneﬁts is provided.
The Conservative proposals make clear that there are no easy solutions
to tackle the basic health economic problem of how to best allocate ﬁnite
NHS resources to satisfy all healthcare needs. However, the proposals
offer a solid blueprint for focused reform moving forward.
Keywords: health technology assessment, health policy, drug reimburse-
ment, decision-making, drug availability.
Introduction
Well-publicized controversies and damning media headlines over
Alzheimer’s and oncology drugs have catapulted the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) ﬁrmly into
the public spotlight [1]. Set up to remedy postcode prescribing
and improve patient access to life-saving treatments, questions
have been raised over the role and performance of NICE as part
of ongoing decisions pertaining to National Health Service
(NHS) drug availability. Particular attention has been paid to the
use and deﬁnition of “cost-effectiveness” alongside clinical efﬁ-
cacy for determining whether a drug should be made available on
the NHS. A recent parliamentary inquiry and Panorama docu-
mentary picked up on these deeply contentious issues [2,3].
In early November of 2008, the Conservative Party published
detailed and substantive proposals—Improving Access to New
Drugs: A Plan to Renew the National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence (NICE) [4]—which look at the work of NICE
and associated issues relating to drug pricing and pharmaceutical
reimbursement. The proposals are rightly supportive of the
important work of NICE, but set out the need to improve its
conﬁguration, operational structure, and efﬁciency to increase
public conﬁdence and foster better patient health outcomes.
Room for Improvement
Six key areas of improvement have been identiﬁed. These
include: 1) the role of NICE; 2) communication and dialogue
with the pharmaceutical industry; 3) the NICE appraisal process;
4) cost-effectiveness and affordability; 5) the implementation of
NICE guidance; and 6) drug pricing. All these areas are consis-
tent with the Conservative commitment to focus on patient
health outcomes rather than the prevailing culture of targets and
central control [5].
The Role of NICE
Founded to counter geographical variations in health care and to
control costs, NICE is responsible for recommending which
drugs and treatments should be provided by the NHS. The
Labour government introduced the agency promising: “Its evi-
dence based guidelines will be used right across the country, so
NICE will help end the unacceptable geographical variations in
care that have grown up in recent years [6].” Ever since, the
Institute has attracted criticisms and been a source of ongoing
media controversy.
As the recent parliamentary inquiry noted, there is a worrying
lack of public conﬁdence in NICE. Although not helped by
media-related opprobrium, recurring criticisms are arguably a
consequence of poor communication regarding NICE’s raison
d’être and indistinct clarity over its appraisal methods [7].
Addressing this “communication deﬁcit” is fundamental to the
operational functioning of NICE and educating the public on
difﬁcult choices regarding life-saving treatments.
With this inmind, the Conservatives have pledged to putNICE
on a statutory basis, introduce a “NICE charter” to codify the
Institute’s roles and responsibilities, and clarify the terminology
regarding mandatory and nonmandatory decisions. In addition,
proposals to extend the work of the Citizens Council and thereby
enhance pubic involvement in NICE have been advanced [8].
Improving Dialogue with Pharma
A key feature of the Conservative proposals relates to improving
dialogue with the pharmaceutical industry. It is widely
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recognized that there are continuing difﬁculties in the relation-
ship between NICE and the pharmaceutical industry, particularly
when medicines are deemed not cost-effective for use in the
NHS. High-proﬁle cases such as Aricept (Alzheimer’s), Sutent,
Nexavar, Avastin, and Torisel (kidney cancer) exemplify and
accentuate this point. Fostering a more cooperative and open
relationship is therefore desired.
To this extent, the proposals make a clear commitment to
promote a policy of cooperation between NICE and industry,
while ensuring a more active role for pharma in discussions
pertaining to health technology assessment (HTA) and the atten-
dant appraisal process. Speciﬁcally, a steering committee com-
prising representatives from industry and NICE would be set up
to facilitate a forum for dynamic and ongoing communication.
The Appraisal Process
The NICE evaluation and appraisal process has been regularly
criticized for being slow, bureaucratic, and intransparent.
Delayed and drawn-out appraisals of cancer drugs, most notably
Herceptin, have proven to be particularly contentious. Some
argue that NICE has become bogged down in administrative
practices, leading to the so-called “NICE blight”. This has led to
inevitable comparisons with the Scottish Medicines Consortium,
which adopts a quicker but less rigorous approach to HTA.
Where possible and appropriate, speeding up the evaluation and
appraisal process is therefore seminal to ensuring clinically efﬁ-
cacious and cost-effective drugs reach patients faster.
The Conservatives have proposed a range of measures to
improve the appraisal process and shift the public perception of
NICE from an inhibitor to a facilitator for enhancing NHS drug
availability. The headline proposals include:
1. End the system of ministerial referral for NICE appraisal
and transfer the responsibility to NICE in conjunction with
a fully independent NHS Board charged with the day-to-
day running of the NHS.
2. Allow appraisals to begin as soon as phase III clinical trials
end and when the licencing process commences.
3. Where appropriate, encourage the appraisal of all new
active substances and technologies.
4. In line with other international authorities, shift the burden
of proof from NICE to the manufacturer.
5. Clearly outline the requirements for submission extending
the use of subgroup analysis and restricted guidance where
appropriate.
6. Use single technology appraisal (STA) as an evaluative
screen during the period between licensing and pro-
duct launch adjusting the measure of cost-effectiveness as
appropriate.
7. Use multitechnology appraisal for more complete apprai-
sal for those technologies where product value is most
uncertain.
8. Transfer appeals to a fully independent panel which is sepa-
rate from NICE.
9. Encourage post-appraisal benchmarking to track existing
treatments and thereby foster targeted disinvestment [4].
The reality is that patients in the NHS in Britain get slower
access to new medicines than any other major European country
[9]. Too often, the NHS treats NICE as an excuse for delay. It is
imperative that a system is cultivated where NICE facilitates
access to the best care at the earliest possible time. Ending min-
isterial referral, allowing earlier evaluation, and using STA as an
evaluative screen represent pragmatically sensible policies to help
with the achievement of this endeavor.
Affordability and Cost-Effectiveness
A much discussed and contentious topic of ongoing debate con-
cerns NICE’s use of a £20–30,000 per quality-adjusted life-year
(QALY) threshold to assess cost-effectiveness. This threshold has
never been formally debated, in parliament or more widely, and
as such is open to criticism from all sides. Arguably, it is not so
much a threshold but rather a guide, yet is seldom understood as
such, and is without basis in either theory or practice. Moreover,
the threshold is seemingly detached from valuations made
elsewhere in the NHS. Evidence suggests that the average
Primary Care Trust (PCT) spends around £12,000 and £19,000
to gain an extra QALY in circulatory disease and cancer,
respectively [10].
An inappropriate and inconsistent cost-effectiveness thresh-
old has serious implications. If too high/low, NHS efﬁciency
is undermined as potentially cost-ineffective/cost-effective treat-
ments are approved/rejected. Either way, resources are poorly
distributed and can lead to “crowding out” or distortionary
effects. It is therefore of paramount importance that the basis for
determining cost-effectiveness is accurate, clear, and evidence
based.
The Conservative proposals seek to address these concerns by
transferring responsibility for “recommending” medicines to the
aforementioned NHS Board, which would be tasked with peri-
odically reviewing the appropriateness of the cost per QALY
threshold and the outcome measure itself. This essentially builds
on the idea of NICE being the “threshold searcher” and the NHS
Board, appointed by the Secretary of State and accountable to
parliament, being the “threshold setter [11].”
The policy document also clearly states dissatisfaction at the
use of a uniform and universal threshold across all disease areas,
which is not beneﬁcial to patients and precludes the optimal
allocation of NHS resources. Rather, measures of cost-
effectiveness should take account of dynamic factors, disease-
speciﬁc requirements, opportunity costs, and budgetary
implications, which are likely to differ over time and according to
different therapeutic areas.
Furthermore, a clear commitment to including the wider
social costs and beneﬁts associated with treatment where possible
(e.g., productivity losses from absenteeism and caregiver burden)
is contained with the document [4]. This would mean that a
change of government at the next general election would bring
about a change in the evaluative perspective from the health-care
payer to societal.
Implementation of Guidance
Given the central importance attached to NICE decisions, and
the resources diverted in doing so, complete and consistent
implementation of guidelines across the NHS is crucial. This is
seminal to ensuring patients receive new drugs and treatments at
the earliest available opportunity, ending the “postcode lottery”
and overcoming health inequalities. NHS bodies are legally
obliged to provide sufﬁcient funding for NICE technology
appraisals within 3 months of approval comparing with other
guidance which is advisory.
The Conservative proposals support the above distinction,
but make it clear that there should be a desire to see greater
encouragement for NHS bodies to adopt relevant guidance
swiftly by emphasizing outcomes and for the 3-month require-
ment to be properly upheld. By focusing on targets rather than
outcomes, NHS bodies will continue to be unable to achieve
good outcomes without the timely adoption of new treatments
and medicines [4].
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Indeed, the Conservatives have pledged to ensure that com-
missioning bodies are required to take account of commissioning
guidelines, including mandatory aspects which relate speciﬁcally
to the delivery of outcomes and relative cost-effectiveness, while
extending commissioning guidelines and building on those guide-
lines currently used by NICE. Furthermore, under a Conservative
government, the implementation of NICE guidance would be
treated as key performance indicator.
NHS Drug Availability
All health-care systems confront a basic health economic
problem: how best to allocate ﬁnite resource to satisfy inﬁnite
health-care demands. The candid truth is that the NHS cannot
afford to purchase every new treatment, and therefore needs to
carefully choose between competing alternatives [1,12]. As more
expensive new drugs are coming to market, the rate of growth in
NHS funding is declining. This reality dictates that cost must be
a factor along with clinical efﬁcacy, and thus the work of NICE
is crucial to establishing a focused decision-making framework
for facilitating the efﬁcient and effective allocation of scarce NHS
resources [7].
Nonetheless, ensuring maximum beneﬁt from ﬁnite drugs
budgets can be facilitated by innovative drug pricing schemes.
The Conservative proposals declare support for the move toward
a greater use of value-based pricing for new medicines, under
which a treatment would be judged in accordance with its clinical
beneﬁts, and the increased application of risk-sharing schemes
where appropriate to the disease area and product. The former
essentially picks up on the proposals outlined in the recent Ofﬁce
of Fair Trading report into the drug pricing [13], while the latter
draws upon the successful use of risk sharing in the cases of
Lucentis and Velcade [14].
The policy document also emphasizes the need to engage the
public in decisions regarding NHS priority setting and associated
drug availability, while ensuring the removal of all ministerial and
political interference in NICE decision-making. The notorious
example ofHerceptin and the intervention by the then Secretary of
State for Health, Patricia Hewitt MP, exempliﬁes the importance
of operational independence in reaching decisions [13].
In addition, the Conservatives have pledged to develop an
approach to drug pricing that better fosters fair and affordable
prices to the NHS, while dynamically incentivizing pharmaceu-
tical R&D. This builds on the idea of further exploring the
potential role of NICE in helping to determine optimal drug
prices for the NHS.
A Basic Health Economic Problem:
There Are No Easy Solutions
As the emotive nature—and attendant media coverage—
surrounding NHS drug availability continues to intensify, it is
clear this important area of policy will continue to move up the
health agenda. This is particularly the case when placed in the
wider context of debates pertaining to patient “top ups” and
reform of the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme [15].
Indeed, it is no surprise that the Secretary of State for Health,
Alan Johnson MP, has recently been making a number of
speeches on the “postcode lottery” and improving speedy uptake
of NICE-approved drugs and medications [16].
The basic health economic problem of how to best allocate
ﬁnite NHS resources to satisfy all health-care needs is inescapable
by nature and highly complex by deﬁnition. It would be wrong,
and frankly disingenuous, for any political party to pretend
otherwise. Nevertheless, the Conservative proposals have opened
the way for important debate around this issue and provide a
solid blueprint for focused reform moving forward. The policy
gauntlet has been thrown down. It is a question to ponder as to
how others, not least the government, will respond.
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